Why:
- Domain values are denormalized into every Qdrant point payload. Without
validation, an unregistered or typo'd domain (e.g. "fier" for "fire")
silently creates a new partition that retrieval never queries — the file
ends up invisible rather than rejected. Tenants also need independently
sized domain sets (one may run 14 insurance lines, another 6), which rules
out an enum.
Changes:
- tenant_domains table (migration 41335d162de8) + repository, unique on
(tenant_id, domain).
- src/application/domains/: ensure_domain_allowed() is the strict-allowlist
check now run inside upload_source_file()'s first transaction, before any
MinIO object, job row, or Qdrant point is written.
- /v1/domains (list/create/patch/disable/enable) gated on its own
domains:read/domains:write scopes, deliberately separate from files:write
so an upload key cannot create partitions. domain itself is immutable
(denormalized into every point payload); only display_name is editable.
Disable blocks new uploads without touching already-indexed points.
Impact:
- BREAKING: POST /v1/files now rejects any domain without an active
tenant_domains row (400, unknown_domain). A domain must be created via
POST /v1/domains before the first upload to it.
Why:
- Code under test (auth resolution, the two-phase upload) opens more than
one session per operation; the existing fixture only exposed one
rolled-back session.
Changes:
- Add a db_sessionmaker fixture sharing one outer transaction.
- Pin loop_scope="session" -- without it, a second async test against the
session-scoped Postgres container fails with "Event loop is closed."
